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that it describes actions of groups of agents not just individ-
uals (ie groups are the system). Also a notion of “team ratio-
nality” is required for the behavioural law; individual
rationality is inappropriate for joint problem solving.
Some recent trends in contemporary DAI can be viewed as
moving towards cooperation level solutions; though there is
still greater need for recognition of this new level. The most
widespread use of deeper models of social phenomena
occurs within the context of communication; in speech act
theory communication primitives and their effects are
explicitly represented and reasoned about by the sender in
order to try and bring about speciﬁc mental states in the
hearer [3]. Other illustrations occur in conﬂict resolution [4]
in which resolution strategies are categorized and selected
according to the desired objective and prevailing circum-
stances; in persuasion/negotiation [5] in which agents rea-
son about how to induce greater cooperativeness in other
community members and in the deﬁnition of likes, goals
and values based on physical dynamics [6].
The beneﬁts of cooperation knowledge level systems
include: enhanced explanation facilities, greater generality
(and hence software reusability) and easier knowledge
acquisition for the multi-agent system designer. Explanation
can be enhanced because group activities can be described
at a meta-level rather than at a task or message level (eg A1
and A2 have a conﬂict about Y). The advances in explana-
tion facilities offered by such systems are especially impor-
tant in environments in which the user plays an active
problem solving role. Software reusability is enhanced by
separating out the domain independent principles from the
domain-dependent knowledge which they make use of. The
generic component embodying the cooperation level can be
applied to new problems merely by providing appropriate
domain knowledge. Finally, the multi-agent system devel-
oper is aided by having a focused set of questions, strategies
and options with which to confront the organization which
commissioned the system.
Here we concentrate on one particular form of social inter-
action, namely the solving of a common problem by a team
of agents - eg several agents lifting a heavy object or driving
in a convoy. A complete cooperation level description
would need to cover the following aspects: the detection of
when team problem solving is required/beneﬁcial, what
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1. Introduction
Sophisticated problem solving is based upon knowledge. In
advanced systems (typiﬁed by expert systems), this knowl-
edge can be divided into two distinct categories: about the
domain and about problem solving per se. Early expert sys-
tems had many important drawbacks including brittleness,
weak explanation and unclear boundaries during knowledge
acquisition [1] - characteristics attributed to their sole use of
surface knowledge. To overcome these problems, second-
generation systems use rich and explicit (deep) models of
knowledge. However such knowledge-level [2] approaches
have yet to be transferred into Distributed AI (DAI). In
multi-agent systems, a cooperation knowledge level would
be concerned with those aspects of problem solving speciﬁ-
cally related to interacting with others - offering rich and
explicit models of various social phenomena (cooperation,
conﬂicts, competition, etc.). In Newell’s taxonomy of com-
puter levels, the cooperation level would be above the
knowledge level. Like the others, it can be reduced to the
level directly below it - ultimately being expressed in terms
of single agents and individual goals, actions and knowl-
edge states. It differs from the individual knowledge level in
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organizational form the team will take (will there be a single
controller, a committee or will all members be equal?, will
decisions require unanimous or majority support?), who
should be in the team (is it best to have small teams of major
contributors or larger teams with less active members?),
how to recruit community members to the team (will they
join out of benevolence or will they need convincing?, if so
how?), how to construct the team plan (single planner or
multiple partial planners?), how to divide the labour within
the team, how to behave once team activity has begun and
how team activity should be terminated.
This type of problem solving is a sophisticated form of col-
laboration; interactions may be protracted, involve several
exchanges of information and opinions or require agents to
modify their stances to accommodate the desires of others.
During such activity there is significant scope for errors,
misunderstandings and changing opinions, especially if the
application domain is itself complex and dynamic. To oper-
ate in such environments agents have to take decisions
based on partial, imprecise views of the system which they
may wish to alter at a later stage as more information
becomes available. To cope with this inherent uncertainty,
incompleteness and dynamicity, it is important that the col-
laborators have a well specified description of how to evalu-
ate (track) their ongoing problem solving and a prescription
of how to behave should it run into difficulties.
Joint responsibility provides a cooperation level model of
collaborative problem solving, based on the notion of joint
intentions (ie a commitment to perform collective action
while in a certain shared mental state [7]). Particular empha-
sis is given to defining conditions under which joint activity
may falter and the actions which must be taken in such cir-
cumstances in order to maintain group coherence. It is,
therefore, appropriate for defining that part of the agent
architecture which has to track joint actions. Previous for-
mulations (eg [8], [9]) are of limited value in dynamic and
unpredictable environments because they fail to address this
problem, concentrating predominately on what it means for
a joint intention to exist. Responsibility subsumes the work
of Cohen and Levesque [7]; defining joint commitment for
both plan and goal states.
2. The Responsibility Framework
Responsibility deﬁnes conditions which must be satisﬁed
before joint action can start and speciﬁes a code of conduct
for agents once problem solving has commenced. It uses
ﬁrst order logic (^ AND, v OR, ~NOT) and the model oper-
ators BEL, GOAL and MB. BEL(x,p) and GOAL(x,p) mean
agent x has p as a belief and a goal respectively, MB({x, y},
p) that x and y mutually believe p1. The standard temporal
1. Mutual belief is taken to be the infinite conjunction of beliefs
about the other agents’ beliefs, about the other agents’ beliefs
(and so on to an infinite depth) about a proposition.
operators: T (always) and ◊ (eventually) are also used. We
use p?;a to mean “action a with p holding initially” and a;p?
to mean “action a with p holding as a consequence”.
2.1 Common and Joint Persistence of Goals
Before joint action can commence a group of agents must
realise they have a common objective that they wish to ful-
ﬁll collaboratively. Recognition may occur through neces-
sity or through belief that a team approach is best. Once the
objective has been agreed, a joint persistent goal (JPG)
exists and individuals become committed to achieving it [7].
However commitments are not irrevocable; they can be
dropped if one team member believes: the goal has been
achieved, its motivation is no longer present or that it will
never be attained. If such events occur, the agent who is no
longer committed cannot simply disregard the remaining
group members; rather it must endeavour to inform them of
its lack of commitment. The rationale for this being that if
one participant is no longer committed, then there must be a
good cause for this and hence the others ought to be made
aware so they do not waste effort unnecessarily.
2.2 Solution Commitment
JPGs are not sufﬁcient for obtaining joint action. They only
specify that agents have a common desire to reach a target
state, they do not specify how to reach this state. At the
cooperation level we are concerned with underlying princi-
ples related to agents’ plans, not implementation speciﬁc
details. Relevant issues include: the fact that participants
must agree to the principle of a common solution, enumer-
ating conditions under which commitment to it can be
dropped and deﬁning how team members should behave
towards each other in such circumstances.
2.2.1 Multi-Agent Planning Syntax
The adopted representation formalism deﬁnes points in the
search space as partially elaborated plans, traversed using
plan transformations. Plans are represented as an action
ordering in which the actions, described by operators, are
strung together with temporal ordering relations [10]. There
are two types of action: those which can be undertaken by
individuals (primitive actions) and those in which groups of
agents work together (social actions)2. Throughout this sec-
tion, let the set of agents in the community be represented
by A, the set of primitive actions which can be performed
by some agent in A by P and the set of social actions which
community A can perform by S. Note P ⊆ S since a primi-
tive act can trivially be performed by 2 or more agents.
Group problem solving requires some actions to be synchro-
nized; there will be relationships between them. Relation-
ships can involve arbitrary numbers of actions and may be
composed entirely of primitive actions, or of social actions
or a mixture of the two. So if s1, s2 ∈ S; p1, p2 ∈ P and
ℜa,b(a,b) the relationship between actions a and b then, the
2. Social actions ultimately give rise to primitive actions
because it is the individuals who have the ability to act.226
PERFORM(<α, a>, Σ’σ) ≡
(∀ <{αw...αx}, σi> ∈Σ ’σ)
RELATION-OK(<α, a>, <{αw...αx}, σi>, Σ’σ)?;
EXECUTE(α, a)
Before a group of agents ({α1...αn} ⊆ A, n≥2) can execute a
social action (σi ∈ S) within the context of action sequence
Σ’σ; any relationships involving σi must be satisﬁed:
PERFORM(<{α1,..,αn}, σi >, Σ’σ) ≡
(∀ <{αw... αx}, σj> ∈ Σ’σ)
RELATION-OK(<{α1..αn}, σi >,<{αw...αx},σj>, Σ’σ)?;
(∃Σ’σi PERFORM(<{α1,..,αn}, σi >, Σ’σi))
where Σ’σi is a solution developed by {α1,..,αn} for solving
σi. PERFORMED indicates whether a joint action has been
carried out and uses EXECUTED instead of EXECUTE.
2.2.3 Deﬁning Solution Commitment
All participants must ﬁrstly acknowledge the principle that
a common solution is needed to tackle the joint act:
NEED-COMMON-SOLUTION(<{α1,..,αn}, σ>) ≡
(◊ ∃Σ’σ PERFORM(<{α1,..,αn}, σ>, Σ’σ))
Commitment to the common solution is also not irrevoca-
ble, especially when agents are situated in dynamic environ-
ments. To aid the execution tracking process, circumstances
in which it is rational to drop commitment to the agreed
solution need to be enumerated. In all subsequent formula-
tions it is assumed that α is a member of the group {α1..αn}.
• the motivation for carrying out one of the actions is not
present (eg the objective already holds or the actions have
already been performed).
LACKING-MOTIVE(<{α1...αn}, σ>, Σ’σ) ≡
{αw,..,αx} ⊆ {α1,..,αn}
(∃ <{αw..αx}, σi> ∈ Σ’σ) ~MOTIVE(<{αw..αx}, σi>)?
• the agreed sequence does not achieve the desired outcome
INVALID (<{α1..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ) ≡
PERFORMED(<{α1,..,αn}, σ >, Σ’σ); ~σ?
• one of the speciﬁed actions cannot be carried out
UNATTAINABLE (<{α1..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ) ≡
{αw,..,αx} ⊆ {α1,..,αn}
(∃ <{αw,..,αx}, σi> ∈Σ ’σ)
T∼PERFORM(<{αw,..,αx}, σi> Σ’σ)
• one of the agreed actions was not carried out
VIOLATED (<{α1..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ) ≡
~PERFORMED(<{α1,..,αn}, σ>, Σ’σ)
These represent situations in which an individual team
member can detect, for itself, that the common solution is
no longer sustainable. In such circumstances it needs to
following relationship may exist: ℜs1,s2(s1, s2), ℜp1,p2(p1,
p2), ℜs1,p1(s1, p1) and ℜp1,s1,s2(p1, s1, s2). Two actions are
independent if ~ℜa,b(a, b). All actions within a sequence are
also subject to at least one relationship - ℜa,a(a, a). Relation-
ships between actions are as important as the actions them-
selves - eg when moving an object in which all parties are
required to lift at the same time, failing to satisfy the rela-
tionship “SIMULT” means the lift will not occur.
Actions can be combined into ﬁnite sequences to specify
more complex interactions. Sequences are composed of at
least one action and may contain mixtures of primitive/
social actions and related/independent actions. A sequence
Σ containing 4 actions (3 social [s1, s2, s3 ∈S], 1 primitive
[p1 ∈P]); two of which are related (s2 and s3) and two of
which are not (p1, s1) is denoted by: Σ = {p1, s1, ℜs2,s3(s2,
s3)}. Primitive actions are assumed to be solved by action
sequences of length one (i.e. p1 is solved by Σ = {p1}). In
goal directed systems, actions are carried out in order to
attain particular objectives; so Σσ means that action
sequence Σ is executed in order to fulﬁll objective σ.
It is useful to distinguish the actions to be performed from
the agents who will execute them. This permits the action
planning mechanisms to be independent of task and
resource allocation considerations. Once the action
sequence has been deﬁned, the agents who will actually per-
form it need to be decided upon; actions and action
sequences must be instantiated:
Primitive Action Instantiation: <α, a>: agent α∈ Α  is
involved in primitive action a ∈P
Social Action Instantiation: <{α1,..,αn}, σ >: agents
α1,..,αn ⊆ A (n > 1) are involved in social action σ∈ S
Action Sequence Instantiation: A sequence of primitive
and social action instantiations. It speciﬁes the actions and
the agents who will perform them. If Σσ is an action
sequence, its instantiation is denoted by Σ’σ
Other predicates associated with actions (a ∈ P, σ∈  S)
include; EXECUTE(α, a) and EXECUTED(α, a) meaning
that α will execute action a next and has just executed a
respectively. MOTIVE(<{α1,..,αn}, σ >) gives the reason
why α1,..,αn wish to achieve σ. This will typically represent
a goal-subgoal hierarchy with the root node giving the rea-
soning for carrying out the joint action. RELATION-OK
indicates that the relationship between two actions σi, σj ∈
Σ’σ is satisﬁed. If the two actions are unrelated then this
returns true:
RELATION-OK(<{αw... αx}, σi>, <{αy... αz}, σj>, Σ’σ) ≡
?ℜσi,σj v (~∃ℜ σi,σj ∈Σ ’σ)
2.2.2 Performing Actions
For an agent (α∈  A) to execute primitive action (a ∈ P)
within the context of action sequence Σ’σ; all relationships
involving a in Σ’σ must be satisﬁed:227
reassess its commitment to the agreed solution:
LOCAL-PROBLEM(α, <{α1..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ) ≡
BEL(α, LACKING-MOTIVE(<{α1..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ) v
INVALID(<{α1..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ) v
UNATTAINABLE(<{α1..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ)) v
VIOLATED(<{α1..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ))
Because of the very nature of group problem solving, if one
member stops contributing the whole initiative may be jeop-
ardised. Therefore if an agent realises that one of its fellow
team members has dropped commitment to the solution, it
needs to reassess its position to take this information into
account. In contrast with the previous reasons, the actual
problem has not been detected locally by the agent:
NON-LOCAL-PROBLEM(α, <{α1..αn}, σ>,Σ’σ)≡α i ≠ α
BEL(α,( ∃αi ∈{α1,..,αn}
LOCAL-PROBLEM(αi, <{α1..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ)))
It is now possible to state the situations under which agent α
can drop commitment to an agreed common solution Σ’σ for
group action <{α1..αn}, σ>:
DROP-SOL-COMMIT(α, <{α1..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ) ≡
LOCAL-PROBLEM(α, <{α1..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ) v
NON-LOCAL-PROBLEM(α, <{α1..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ)
It is not sufﬁcient for an agent to simply disregard a joint
action once it is no longer committed to the agreed solution.
The reason for this being that just because one team member
(α) has detected a problem it cannot be assumed that all its
accomplices have been able to so. Therefore to ensure such
information is disseminated as widely as possible within the
group, α must endeavour to inform all other team members
of the fact that it is no longer committed and also the reason
why. This enables them to reassess the actions involving α
and the agreed solution itself - meaning that if the common
solution needs to be abandoned or reﬁned, then the amount
of wasted resource is minimised because futile activities are
stopped at the earliest opportunity. Individual solution com-
mitment (ISC) represents a high level description of how
each team member should behave in its own problem solv-
ing and towards others with regard to the agreed solution:
ISC(α, <{α1..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ) ≡
WHILE ~DROP-SOL-COMMIT(α,<{α1..αn},σ>,Σ’σ) DO1
(∀ <{α, αw..αx}, σi> ∈Σ ’σ){ α,αw..αx}⊆{α1..αn}
BEL(α, ◊PERFORM(<{α, αw..αx}, σi>,Σ ’σi)) ^
◊PERFORM(<{α, αw..αx}, σi>,Σ ’σi))
 WHEN GOAL(α, MB({α1..αn},
DROP-SOL-COMMIT(α, <{α1..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ)))
Therefore for each action that α is involved in, it should
1. WHILE p DO q WHEN r: while p is true, q will remain true.
When p becomes false, q will be false and r will become true
believe that it is going to perform that action and also that it
will actually perform the action at the appropriate time. This
mental state continues until α has good cause not to follow
the agreed solution; whereupon it aims to disseminate its
lack of commitment to all the others. Combining the results
of this section, there are two facets concerned with perform-
ing actions in a social group: agreeing to the principle of a
common solution and deﬁning how individuals should
behave once such a solution has been chosen:
SOL-COMMITMENT(<{α1,..,αn}, σ>) ≡
MB({α1,..,αn},
NEED-COMMON-SOLUTION(<{α1,.., αn}, σ>)) ^
MB({α1,..,αn}, (∀α i ∈ {α1..αn}
ISC(αi,< { α1..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ)))
2.3 Full Joint Responsibility
We can now deﬁne the mental state of joint responsibility
which a group of agents {α1,..,αn} must adopt if they are to
jointly solve common problem σ:
JOINT-RESPONSIBILITY (<{α1,..,αn}, σ>) ≡
MB ({α1,..,αn}, JPG(<{α1,..,αn}, σ>)) ^
MB ({α1,..,αn}, SOL-COMMITMENT (<{α1.. αn}, σ>))
3. Responsibility in Transport Management
Electricity transportation is concerned with the process of
taking electrical energy from where it is produced to where
it is consumed. It requires sophisticated monitoring and any
problems need to be identified at the earliest opportunity
[11]. The CSI (Control System Interface) receives messages
from the network and analyses them to determine whether
they represent a fault. The AAA (Alarm Analysis Agent)
pinpoints elements at fault and the BAI (Blackout Area
Identifier) indicates groups of elements out of service
(BOA). In the cooperative scenario depicted by fig 1, the
CSI receives an indication that a fault has occurred and
informs the other two, also providing them with information
for updating their network topology models on which their
diagnosis is based. The AAA starts to identify the specific
network elements at fault - initially producing a quick,
approximate answer which it subsequently refines using a
more accurate procedure. In parallel, the BAI starts deter-
mining the BOA, which when calculated is passed onto the
AAA. In order to be consistent, the elements identified by
the AAA should also be in the BOA produced by the BAI -
a fact taken into account by the AAA during its detailed
diagnosis. While the AAA and BAI are working on diagno-
sis, the CSI continues to monitor the network in order to
detect significant changes in status or indicate whether the
fault was only transient. Once the 3 agents have been
informed and agreed to participate, a joint goal exists: σ =
<{AAA, BAI, CSI},DIAGNOSE-FAULT>. Each has a role
to play and by combining their expertise, problem solving is
enhanced. Robustness is attained by sharing information
which is available within the system, but not readily avail-228
able to all the agents. The role of joint responsibility is to
provide the basis for determining which information should
be shared and how agents should act when they receive it.
When the necessary preconditions for joint action have been
met, the actual solution can be developed. The responsibil-
ity framework is independent of any particular planning par-
adigm; so it may be derived by one or more agents. The
outcome of this process will be an action sequence instantia-
tion Σ’diagnose for σ: {PAR (<{CSI}, MONITOR-NET-
WORK>, <{BAI},PRODUCE-BOA>, <{AAA}, INITIAL-
DIAGNOSIS>), AFTER(<{BAI}, PRODUCE-BOA>,
<{AAA}, FINAL-DIAGNOSIS>), AFTER (<{AAA}, INI-
TIAL-DIAGNOSIS>, <{AAA}, FINAL-DIAGNOSIS>)}
Having established the common solution, responsibility
requires each agent to carry out its agreed part whilst com-
mitment is rational. If everything goes smoothly, the objec-
tive will be satisfied and the joint goal will be terminated
according to the rules specified for joint persistent goals.
However because of the environmental dynamics and inher-
ent uncertainty, several events may disrupt this activity.
Related to the goal of diagnosing faults, the CSI may come
to realise that the group of alarms only represented a tran-
sient fault (motivation for σ no longer present) or the AAA
may realise that it is not being supplied with sufficient
alarms with which to make a diagnosis (σ will never be
attained). Problems may also arise with the agreed solution:
the CSI may detect a substantial change in the network,
meaning that the models being used by the AAA and BAI
are so inaccurate that any ensuing diagnosis will be incor-
rect (plan invalid) or that it is no longer receiving informa-
tion about the network and so is unable to monitor its status
(plan unattainable). The BAI may be distracted by an
unplanned task and be unable to produce the BOA at the
agreed time (plan violation), meaning the AAA cannot com-
pare its initial hypotheses with the black out area to ensure
consistency before undertaking the detailed analysis.
This collaborative activity is fraught with opportunities for
inconsistencies and when it does run into problems, it is
usually detected by only one team member. Without a pre-
scription of how to behave or criteria against which to eval-
uate joint activity, the team may perform in an
uncoordinated manner. For example if after having detected
the fault is transient, the CSI failed to inform the others they
would continue to expend resources on diagnosing a nonex-
AAA
BAI CSI
Figure 1: Cooperating Agents in transport management
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istent fault. In this case, responsibility ensures the CSI tries
to inform the others that the motive is no longer present.
4. Conclusions
We have proposed a high-level model of collaborative prob-
lem solving as a contribution towards the development of a
cooperation knowledge level. Responsibility describes the
conditions which need to be satisﬁed before joint problem
solving can commence and prescribes how individuals
should behave once it has begun. Any theory of DAI ought
to account for how aggregates of agents can achieve joint
actions that are robust and continuable despite intermediate
foul-ups and inconsistency [12]. Responsibility offers a step
towards this; providing mechanisms for controlling activity
in dynamic and unpredictable environments, whilst retain-
ing a degree of generality and predictability. Empirical evi-
dence to substantiate this claim has been obtained [13].
Compared with groups of selﬁsh problem solvers and com-
munities in which social interactions just emerge, agents
organised using the responsibility model performed over
twice as well as the other two if there was a greater than
10% chance of the problem solving running into difﬁculty.
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